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IntroductIon
In the United States, the public abhors few crimes as much as those that 
a mother commits against her infant child. Unable to reconcile these acts with 
deeply-rooted beliefs that mothers are inherently nurturing and self-sacrificing, the 
American legal system and public typically demand harsh punishments for what 
they perceive to be violations of human nature. However, in the case of mothers 
who commit neonaticide, this trend toward harsh criminal penalties and public out-
rage may not be a just response to these infant deaths. Neonaticide, the killing of 
an infant within its first twenty-four hours of life,1 differs from other types of infant 
deaths in that women who commit neonaticide are typically young and acting either 
out of psychotic motivators or as a result of adaptive evolution. 
There are two conflicting theories about what causes these women to kill. 
Under the psychotic break theory, these women often suffer from symptoms that 
culminate in a psychotic break at the time of the infant’s birth.2 This psychotic break 
results in the spontaneous killing of the infant by its mother.3 Some experts have 
accepted these acts as part of a recognized syndrome called neonaticide syndrome.4 
However, the concepts that define neonaticide syndrome have recently come under 
fire.5 Some experts now contend that women committing neonaticide do not do so 
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     1.  Beth E. Bookwalter, Note, Throwing the Bath Water Out with the Baby: Wrongful 
Exclusion of Expert Testimony on Neonaticide Syndrome, 78 B.u. L. rev. 1185, 1186 (1998). 
     2.  See Shannon Farley, Comment, Neonaticide: When the Bough Breaks and the Cradle 
Falls, 52 Buff. L. rev. 597, 614 (2004); see also Phillip J. Resnick, Murder of the Newborn: A 
Psychiatric Review of Neonaticide, 126 Am. J. PsychIAtry 1414, 1415 (1970). 
     3.  Farley, supra note 2, at 614.
     4.  See id. at 601.
     5.  See Susan Hatters Friedman, James Cavney & Phillip J. Resnick, Mothers Who Kill: 
because of mental health or psychotic reasons, but rather as a result of adaptive 
evolution.6 Under this theory, these women, typically adolescents with minimal 
resources,7 commit neonaticide because the infants are not desired and because the 
new mothers do not have the resources to care for the newborns.8 Some experts be-
lieve that this occurs as a response to external coercion rather than internal illness.9 
Regardless of whether these deaths occur as the result of a psychotic break or evo-
lutionary instinct, many factual similarities exist in neonaticide deaths. 
However, evidence of these similarities is routinely not permitted in the 
criminal trials of these women.10 It also appears to be entirely absent from the public 
narrative about infanticide. This absence prevents those who commit neonaticide 
from obtaining appropriate and consistent penalties when they enter the criminal 
justice system. An inadequate understanding of the experiences of women com-
mitting neonaticide results in inconsistent criminal charges,11 an inability of these 
women to present a complete defense at their trials,12 and inconsistent sentences 
for factually similar crimes.13 Because adolescents commit neonaticide more fre-
quently than any other group,14 the current trends in the prosecution of neonaticide 
should be of exceptional importance to those studying juveniles in the criminal 
justice system.
Criminal law reform proposals have called for remedies such as clear sen-
tencing guidelines for neonaticide15 or the allowance of evidence regarding neonat-
icide syndrome into trials,16 but these suggestions have not come to fruition. This 
Note asserts that these reform proposals cannot come to fruition until the media 
changes its portrayal of neonaticide to include information about the experiences 
of these women leading up to the infant deaths. This information is essential in or-
der for these women to build complete defenses and to rebut the inference that all 
women who commit neonaticide do so deliberately.
Part I of this Note will examine the experiences of women accused of com-
mitting neonaticide by discussing their mental states leading up to the births and 
deaths of their newborns, and by examining the ways that the criminal justice system 
Evolutionary Underpinnings and Infanticide Law, 30 BehAv. scI. & L. 585, 588–89 (2012).
     6.  Id. at 586.
     7.  Id. at 588.
     8.  Id. at 588, 591.
     9.  Id. at 588.
     10.  Data about neonaticide rarely distinguishes between women over or under eighteen 
years of age. All of the data used in this Note applies to adolescent and adult women commit-
ting neonaticide unless otherwise stated.
     11.  See Friedman et al., supra note 5, at 592–93. 
     12.  Farley, supra note 2, at 601–02; see also Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1205–06. 
     13.  See Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1194–96.
     14.  Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
     15.  See generally United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 2010).
     16.  See generally Bookwalter, supra note 1.
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deals with these infant deaths. Part II will examine the role played by the media in 
establishing a national narrative of motherhood and neonaticide, and will demon-
strate the ways in which the media influences these trials and hinders the ability of 
the defendants to present a complete defense or obtain an unbiased criminal judg-
ment. Finally, the conclusion of this Note will assert that better regulation of the 
media will be essential in improving the judicial outcomes of the women and girls 
accused of neonaticide.
I. IntroductIon to neonAtIcIde In the AmerIcAn crImInAL JustIce system
A. Introduction to Neonaticide
Approximately 250 cases of neonaticide occur every year in the United 
States.17 Adolescents commit neonaticide more frequently than any other group of 
women.18 These adolescents typically share several characteristics.19 These girls are 
likely to be in their late teens, living with their parents, and unmarried.20 They typi-
cally have a low socioeconomic status,21 and their personalities are passive and es-
pecially immature for their age.22 They are more socially isolated than their peers,23 
and are often victims of abuse.24 The high school aged girls in this group were 
typically in relationships that lasted only a few weeks and often ended before the 
pregnancy was discovered.25 Their pregnancies were most often accidental.26 The 
     17.  Id. at 1177. 
     18.  See Susan Hatters Friedman, Sarah McCue Horwitz & Phillip J. Resnick, Child Mur-
der by Mothers: A Critical Analysis of the Current State of Knowledge and a Research Agenda, 
162 Am. J. PsychIAtry 1578, 1579 (2005); see also Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
     19.  These findings have remained consistent among studies using administrative samples 
and correctional populations both inside the United States and in other countries. See Friedman 
et al., supra note 18, at 1582.  
     20.  Id. at 1579.
     21.  Id.
     22.  See Resnick, supra note 2, at 1416.
     23.  See Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1193.
     24.  Margaret G. Spinelli, A Systematic Investigation of 16 Cases of Neonaticide, 158 Am. 
J. PsychIAtry 811, 812 (2001). One study of twenty-three women who committed neonaticide 
revealed that 47.8% of the women reported a major trauma in their childhood, while 26.1% 
of those women also reported abuse during adulthood. Sabine Amon, Hanna Putkonen, Ghitta 
Weizmann-Henelius, Maria P. Almiron, Anton K. Formann, Martin Voracek, Markku Eronen, 
Jenny Yourstone, Max Friedrich & Claudia M. Klier, Potential Predictors in Neonaticide: The 
Impact of the Circumstances of Pregnancy, 15 ArchIves Women’s mentAL heALth 167, 169 
(2012).
     25.  Michelle Oberman, Mothers Who Kill: Coming to Terms with Modern Infanticide, 8 
dePAuL J. heALth cAre L. 3, 28–29 (2004).
     26.  Molly Karlin, Damned if She Does, Damned if She Doesn’t: De-legitimization of 
Women’s Agency in Commonwealth v. Woodward, 18 coLum. J. Gender & L. 125, 159 (2008).
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experiences of these adolescents demonstrate a pattern of “powerlessness, poverty, 
and alienation.”27 Some assert that a combination of these characteristics results 
in a break from reality during their pregnancy, during the birth of their children, 
and  during the ultimate death of their newborn. Though the American media has 
portrayed these girls as cold-hearted killers, research has indicated that a subset of 
those committing neonaticide do so without reasoned intentionality.28 At least one 
study has shown that women who commit neonaticide show an elevated rate of 
personality disorders, and the symptoms consistently experienced by these women 
have been coined neonaticide syndrome.29 
 While not all women who commit neonaticide share the same pregnancy 
and birth experiences, many of them experience similar pathology leading up to 
and resulting in the death of their newborns.30 Collectively, these experiences make 
up neonaticide syndrome.31 Upon becoming pregnant, these women experience in-
tense fear.32 They fear public shame and the possibility that their pregnancies will 
be viewed as proof that they have been sexually promiscuous or irresponsible.33 
Younger girls fear parental abandonment, anger, and punishment.34 They simply 
do not view disclosing their pregnancies as an option,35 and they encounter great 
mental and emotional turmoil when presented with the crisis of how to handle 
their pregnancies. Those who commit neonaticide may attempt to conceal their 
pregnancies,36 or their fear and depression may become so great that the women 
enter into a state of severe and pathological denial of their pregnancies.37 These 
two experiences sometimes co-occur,38 but pregnancy denial represents a more se-
vere flaw in the woman’s psychological rationalization of the pregnancy. Women 
experiencing pregnancy denial genuinely believe that they are not pregnant, and in 
some cases their bodies will mask the physical symptoms of the pregnancy.39 These 
adolescents have no awareness of their pregnancies and will maintain their denial 
in the face of intense questioning by peers and physical changes in their bodies.40
     27.  See Friedman et al., supra note 18, at 1582.
     28.  See generally Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415.
     29.  Farley, supra note 2, at 601.
     30.  See generally Resnick, supra note 2, at 1415–16.
     31.  Farley, supra note 2, at 601.
     32.  Jennie Lusk, Modern New Mexican Neonaticide: Tranquilizing with this Jewel/The 
Torments of Confusion, 11 tex. J. Women & L. 93, 96–98 (2001).  
     33.  See Farley, supra note 2, at 601. 
     34.  See Lusk, supra note 32, at 96–98.
     35.  See Megan C. Hogan, Note, Neonaticide and the Misuse of the Insanity Defense, 6 
Wm. & mAry J. Women & L. 259, 263–64 (1999).  
     36.  Amon et al., supra note 24, at 168.
     37.  Farley, supra note 2, at 612.
     38.  Amon et al., supra note 24, at 168.
     39.  See Friedman et al., supra note 5, at 588. 
     40.  Farley, supra note 2, at 612–13.
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Neonaticide syndrome is a “clinical entity consisting of behaviors and 
symptoms that occur during the stages of pregnancy, delivery, and [the newborn’s 
death].”41 It begins with a pathological denial of and disassociation from one’s 
pregnancy.42 This denial continues until the birth of the newborn, at which point 
the woman cannot continue in her delusion.43 Because these women are unaware of 
their pregnancies, the births often take place in bathrooms.44 One study examined 
sixteen instances of neonaticide and found that the women experienced various 
atypical mental states during the birthing process.45 It found that:
All of the women described “watching” themselves during the birth. 
Eleven denied pain, and five described the pain as “not bad.” Twelve 
women experienced dissociative hallucinations as an internal com-
mentary of critical and argumentative voices. Fourteen women 
experienced brief amnesia, and nine of those women described as-
sociated psychotic symptoms at the sight of the infant. Upon reinte-
gration, the women could not account for the dead infant.46
Upon the birth of the infant, these women experience a “brief psychotic 
break” that either results in the neglect of the newborn or in the mother actively 
killing the newborn.47 Though the media portrays the mothers as being unfeeling 
during these deaths, under the theory of neonaticide syndrome, the deaths of these 
newborns are more likely the result of terror, panic, or fury that the adolescents ex-
perience during this psychotic break.48 The mother does not view the newborn as her 
child, but rather as a “foreign body” that must be eliminated.49 Some women lose 
consciousness while giving birth, causing those newborns who end up being born 
while the mother is seated on a toilet to drown.50 Other women who commit neonat-
icide, especially young girls, may panic about someone discovering the birth and 
neglect the newborn in a panicked attempt to clean up the area in which they gave 
birth.51 Others respond to this panic and fear by actively killing their newborns.52 
Mothers who actively kill their infants, as opposed to neglecting the newborn 
     41.  Id. at 612.
     42.  Id. at 612–13.
     43.  Id. at 613.
     44.  Id.
     45.  See Spinelli, supra note 24, at 811–12.
     46.  Id. at 811.
     47.  See Judith E. Macfarlane, Note, Neonaticide and the “Ethos of Maternity”: Traditional 
Criminal Law Defenses and the Novel Syndrome, 5 cArdozo Women’s L.J. 175, 199 (1998).
     48.     See id. at 184.
     49.  Id. at 197. 
     50.  See Oberman, supra note 25, at 30. 
     51.  Id. at 30.
     52.  Id.; see also Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1196.
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until it passes away, often receive significantly greater sentences.53 However, these 
killings may have been no more premeditated than the births themselves.54 The 
extreme facts regarding how the newborns were killed in these cases likely do not 
indicate any additional malice toward the newborn—under the theory of neonati-
cide syndrome, they are merely different responses of women suffering from the 
same syndrome.
The evolutionary adaptive theory of neonaticide does not challenge the de-
nial experienced by the pregnant women or the potential for them to be physically 
unaware of their pregnancies.55 It breaks down the denial experienced by these 
women into three different types: affective denial, pervasive denial, and psychotic 
denial.56 Affective denial results in an emotional denial of a pregnancy, though the 
woman maintains cognitive awareness of the pregnancy.57 Pervasive denial can re-
sult in physical and mental denial of pregnancy combined with masked symptoms 
of the pregnancy.58 Psychotic denial, the most severe type, is claimed to be more 
rare and more likely to occur in women with histories of schizophrenia.59 This the-
ory asserts that, due to external coercion and an inability to raise the newborn, these 
women instinctively kill the newborns.60 
B. Courts’ Response to Neonaticide
While most western countries have developed infanticide legislation to deal 
with the unique circumstances surrounding these deaths,61 the United States has no 
such legislation. Instead, neonaticide is prosecuted as anything from the unlawful 
disposal of a body to first-degree murder.62 In countries with infanticide legisla-
tion, women committing any type of infanticide will typically receive probation 
or commitment to a facility that can address their mental health issues.63 Many of 
these countries do not require any formal diagnosis of a mental health issue in order 
for the women to receive such treatment.64 These more lenient sentences arguably 
reflect international awareness of the “biological vulnerability” of pregnant women 
caused by, among other things, hormonal changes that occur with any pregnancy.65 
     53.  See, e.g., United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 644 (8th Cir. 2010). 
     54.  See, e.g., id.
     55.  Friedman et al., supra note 5, at 588.
     56.  Id.
     57.  Id.
     58.  Id.
     59.  Id.
     60.  See id.
     61.  See Spinelli, supra note 24.
     62.  Oberman, supra note 25, at 31.
     63.  Spinelli, supra note 24, at 811.
     64.  See Friedman et al., supra note 5, at 587.
     65.  Spinelli, supra note 24, at 812.
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 The findings regarding the low rates of mental health issues among those 
committing neonaticide may shed some light on the United States’ lack of special 
legislation or leniency for these deaths. Some proponents of evolutionary adapta-
tion theory have explained their opposition to these lenient international laws by 
explaining that “to excuse depressed, manic or psychotic women who kill their 
newborns at the time of giving birth” benefits the wrong population.66 
However, the United States’ lack of infanticide or neonaticide legislation 
means that those accused of committing neonaticide are inconsistently charged.67 
In some cases, no charges are brought at all.68 In most cases, the initial charges are 
pled down to a lesser offense.69 Sentencing varies greatly from state to state,70 and 
these women may receive anything from probation to life in prison.71 Such incon-
sistent sentences for acts that are often very factually similar must raise a question 
about whether justice is being achieved in these cases.72 Further, these inconsisten-
cies and unpredictable trials indicate that our criminal justice system is not operat-
ing as efficiently as it could be. 
Some commentators have noted the problematic nature of inconsistent 
sentencing at the federal level.73 The federal sentencing guideline drafters did not 
contemplate acts such as neonaticide,74 and the guidelines do not take into consid-
eration mitigating factors such as a woman experiencing a psychotic break immedi-
ately prior to the birth. At least one commentator has advocated for new and explicit 
sentencing guidelines for neonaticide offenses.75 However, this proposal has not 
been implemented.76 Clear sentencing guidelines would decrease the inconsisten-
cies in criminal punishments that women experience. However, they would not im-
prove the ability of these women to exercise their Sixth Amendment rights at trial. 
Because consistent sentencing measures do not assist women during the trial stage 
of the criminal process, they can serve as only one piece of a larger reform strategy.
 Women whose cases go to trial encounter numerous obstacles as they at-
tempt to exercise their Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense. First, 
while the defendants can sometimes present evidence that other women have had 
     66.  Friedman et al., supra note 5, at 594.
     67.  See Spinelli, supra note 24.
     68.  Oberman, supra note 25, at 31. 
     69.  Id. at 92–93.
     70.  See Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1194–96 (comparing cases from Ohio, Louisiana, 
and New York).
     71.  Oberman, supra note 25, at 31.
     72.  See Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1194.
     73.  Margaret Ryznar, A Crime of Its Own? A Proposal for Achieving Greater Sentencing 
Consistency in Neonaticide and Infanticide Cases, 47 U.S.F. L. rev. 459, 462 (2013).
     74.  See United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 646–47 (8th Cir. 2010); see also Ryznar, 
supra note 73, at 462.
     75.  Ryznar, supra note 73, at 462–63.
     76.  See Deegan, 605 F.3d at 625.
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similar experiences during their pregnancies before committing neonaticide, the 
defendants cannot present a “psychological profile” linking the symptoms to a spe-
cific syndrome.77 Evidence about neonaticide syndrome is generally inadmissible 
in courts for several reasons. At least one court has refused to admit this evidence 
because neonaticide syndrome has not undergone and passed the Frye or Daubert 
admissibility tests.78 The fact that some disagree about whether this pattern of be-
havior meets the requirements for a syndrome and that neonaticide syndrome has 
not been published or verified by many medical experts has also hurt its chances for 
admissibility.79 Lack of empirical evidence has prevented some state courts from 
recognizing neonaticide syndrome.80 Finally, a lack of understanding about the dif-
ference between the symptoms involved in neonaticide syndrome and those con-
stituting postpartum depression has led at least one court to decide that the cost of 
having an out-of-state expert testify in these cases is too high to justify allowing the 
testimony if a local postpartum expert is available.81
 Even though neonaticide syndrome may not be the predominant theory ex-
plaining these deaths, several of its relevant symptoms are still accepted in the 
medical community and may decrease the legal culpability of these women. For 
instance, defendants may wish to present evidence about the physical or mental 
denial of their pregnancies as part of their defenses. Unfortunately, the experts 
brought into trial rarely specialize in neonaticide, and they consequently do not 
have sufficient knowledge to testify on behalf of the defendants. Instead, experts 
often specialize in postpartum depression or more common mental illnesses that are 
not linked to pregnancy. Because the experiences of women committing neonati-
cide do not fall neatly into insanity defenses,82 a failure to admit evidence about the 
frequency with which others experienced similar symptoms means that defendants 
can only testify about what they experienced during their own pregnancies and 
birthing processes.83 This cripples their credibility as witnesses, and consequently 
their defenses. 
Any expert witnesses who do testify for the defendants will have similar 
credibility issues because they will be unable to support their assertions that these 
women experienced symptoms such as denial of pregnancy or a temporary psycho-
sis that led to the newborn’s death with evidence that other pregnant women have 
    
     77.  See People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 323 (N.Y. 1996).
     78.  Id.
     79.  Macfarlane, supra note 47, at 218.
     80.  Strawbridge v. Lord, No. 9:04-CV-0268, 2012 WL 1036089, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 
2012).
     81.  See Commonwealth v. Dupre, 2005 PA Super. 12, ¶ 22, 866 A.2d 1089, 1103.
     82.  Some experts contend that the experiences of these women are more properly defined 
as personality disorders rather than mental illnesses. Amon et al., supra note 24, at 168.
     83.  See Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1205.
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experienced these same symptoms.84 Because suspicion of these women is so high 
and some of the ways in which the newborns are killed are quite gruesome, informa-
tion about the theories behind these deaths is essential to combat the misconception 
that these defendants are trying to escape liability for deliberate murder.85 A failure 
to admit this evidence allows the jury to think that the defendant’s experiences were 
unique,86 thus placing a prejudicial burden on the defendant to prove the pervasive 
nature of her symptoms in neonaticide cases.87 The courts’ failure to admit expert 
witness testimony as evidence that many women committing neonaticide experience 
a similar pathology before the deaths occur infringes on the Sixth Amendment rights 
of these defendants to present a complete defense. 
 Further, a blanket restriction on evidence regarding neonaticide syndrome 
in these trials means that these women are unable to obtain the medical treatment 
that they may need.88 When adolescents are on trial after committing neonaticide, 
the court is often required to effectively step into the shoes of parents to make a 
decision that protects both society and the juvenile in the courtroom. In order to do 
so, the court must have all of the relevant information in front of it. Though some 
medical experts assert that the majority of those committing neonaticide do not suf-
fer from psychosis or insanity, the interests of justice should demand that a judge 
has information about the similar experiences of those who commit neonaticide 
available for assessment. Prison sentences are a more common punishment than 
commitments to psychiatric facilities.89 Without information about the prevalence 
of the symptoms experienced by these women at the sentencing stage of the crimi-
nal trial, proper mental health treatment cannot be ordered when it is needed. Con-
sequently, those who are suffering from mental illness or personality disorders will 
end their prison terms with the same or worse pathology than they had at the time 
that they committed neonaticide.90 Thus, the criminal justice system fails to offer 
rehabilitation services where they may be both necessary and effective. 
II. murder And the medIA
A.  The Changing Cultural Ideology About Motherhood
The media plays an under-assessed but highly influential role in determin-
ing how the legal system addresses neonaticide. To understand the media’s role in 
these trials, groundwork must first be laid about how western civilization’s cultural 
     84.  See People v. Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 323 (N.Y. 1996).
     85.  See generally Bookwalter, supra note 1, at 1194–96.
     86.  Id. at 1205.
     87.  Id. at 1192.
     88.  See Macfarlane, supra note 47, at 182.
     89.  Resnick, supra note 2, at 1418.
     90.  Spinelli, supra note 24, at 812.
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beliefs about motherhood have developed and changed over the past two decades. 
In a study about this topic, Emma Cunliffe focused on how Australia has addressed 
unexplained infant deaths over the past several decades.91 Her study revealed a 
strong connection between the media’s portrayal of these deaths, the medical theo-
ries about how they occur, and bias in the courtroom.92 
An analysis of the increasing criminalization of women whose infants die 
suddenly will illustrate this point. In the 1970s to 1990s, families who experienced 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS) were looked upon with sympathy.93 In the 
1970s, Alfred Steinschneider’s theory posited that SIDS was a tragic occurrence 
that was related to prolonged apnea issues in infants.94 This theory was well ac-
cepted, and scientists largely focused their SIDS research on the syndrome’s apnea-
related causes.95 In 1994, the mother whom Steinschneider had written about in 
his research as having suffered five SIDS deaths in her family confessed to having 
murdered each of her children.96 Though she later recanted her confession, it gained 
enormous publicity and caused widespread suspicion about how many other moth-
ers had gotten away with murder.97 
Suddenly, medical researchers and the legal community alike experienced a 
dramatic cultural shift in how they viewed mothers whose children had experienced 
SIDS.98 The cultural ideology about motherhood shifted to one of distrust, and the 
prevailing theory of SIDS investigation shifted from a medical one (positing that 
the deaths were linked to apnea) to a legal one that looked at mothers suspicious-
ly.99 Newspapers, medical journals, and the general public all began to view SIDS 
as a cover for murder.100 Though mothers whose young children unexpectedly died 
had historically been viewed with some amount of sympathy,101 the general public 
and legal scholars began to view child homicide as the most morally heinous crime 
in existence, deserving of the harshest criminal punishment.102 Criminalization of 
women whose infants had died of unknown causes increased,103 and medical ex-
perts shifted their work from looking for apnea-related causes of these deaths to 
seeking out signs of foul play.104  
     91.  emmA cunLIffe, murder, medIcIne And motherhood 25–67 (2011).
     92.  Id. at 193–206. 
     93.  Id. at 11.
     94.  Id. at 30. 
     95.  Id. at 30–31.
     96.  Id. at 35.
     97.  Id. at 35–36.
     98.  Id.
     99.  Id.
     100.  Id. at 12.
     101.  Id. at 11.
     102.  Id. at 12.
     103.  Id. at 12–13.
     104.  Id. at 36.
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As the cultural story of motherhood has changed, the way that society judg-
es and categorizes specific mothers has changed as well.105 Society often equates 
inadequate mothering with criminal liability.106 If an infant passes away and the 
mother is found to have neglected it during its life, society instantly suspects the 
mother of murder.107 These suspicions often have no basis in evidence, but they ex-
hibit a deeply rooted and often unconscious bias. This bias makes its way into the 
courtroom during the trials of these accused women, and the media’s role in creat-
ing it must be closely scrutinized. Journalists necessarily enjoy a great amount of 
freedom in the way that they report the news, but some restraint may be necessary 
when this freedom has an abnormally high ability to place the rights of citizens ac-
cused of crimes at risk.
B. The Media’s Role in Increasing the Criminalization of Adolescent Mothers
Because the public gets the bulk of its information about the criminal jus-
tice system in general, as well as about specific criminal trials from the media, the 
media’s lack of restraint can have devastating consequences for the women accused 
of having murdered their newborn infants. The media is the vehicle that brings in-
formation, such as the confession of the mother from Steinschneider’s case study, 
into the general public’s awareness.108 Its presentation of this sensitive information 
guides the public discourse about these deaths. It reaches the individuals who  may 
be jurors, judges, or experts testifying at trials. Cunliffe’s study demonstrates sev-
eral ways in which this biases courtrooms and jeopardizes defendants’ rights.109 The 
risk for injustice is higher with these trials because, while the facts underlying the 
crimes may shock the conscience, they may be more indicative of severe mental 
distress than of malice or intent.
While reporting of crimes is an essential part of society, the way in which 
these crimes are being reported gives cause for concern. Freedom of speech nec-
essarily prevents journalists from having stringent accountability mechanisms in 
place to regulate their reporting. Though some amount of accountability exists 
through state regulatory laws involving defamation and privacy tort actions, the 
application of First Amendment doctrine has caused these remedies to apply only 
in the most extreme of circumstances.110 
Most journalists have adopted the “voluntarily embraced” code of ethics 
     105.  Id. at 100.
     106.  See id. at 101.
     107.  Id. at 37.
     108.  See id. at 157–90.
     109.  See id.  
     110.  Richard T. Karcher, Tort Law and Journalism Ethics, 40 Loy. u. chI. L.J. 781, 
782–83 (2009).
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from the Society of Professional Journalists,111 but a survey indicating that 62% of 
journalists believe that journalism is going in the wrong direction shows that not 
even journalists themselves feel these standards are sufficient to hold the journalism 
community accountable for its reporting.112 One part of the code of ethics requires 
journalists to “seek truth and report it,” and to be honest, fair, and courageous in 
their reporting.113 This has been described as the most crucial of journalists’ obliga-
tions because the press controls the public’s reception of news, and it has the first 
opportunity to color the way in which the public will receive new information.114 
Journalists are further instructed to ensure that they are properly representing the 
news and avoiding sensationalism.115 However, the code of ethics has no external 
enforcement mechanism.116 Consequently, it may fail as a tool for holding journal-
ists accountable for abiding by the standards to which they profess to adhere.
While many well-respected journalistic organizations exist, a new type of 
widely read media known as “infotainment” has emerged that draws consumers 
into its news articles with gimmicks such as highly emotional language or pho-
tographs of victims.117 Rather than avoiding sensationalism, popular infotainment 
organizations feed on it.118 Infotainment articles feature a mixture of entertainment 
and educational pieces, and they further strain journalism ethics, as the goal of 
infotainment is entertainment rather than enlightenment.119 The benefits of info-
tainment news include increased public interest in national events and increased 
revenue to news services, but the drawback is a severe blow to journalistic integrity 
that poses a risk to both infotainment organizations as well as serious journalistic 
agencies. Infotainment news presents information in a way that impairs the public’s 
ability to separate fact from opinion.120 It also lends itself toward an adversarial 
reporting style that reinforces anger and baseless stereotypes.121 Infotainment news 
organizations use headlines intended to outrage rather than inform, such as “Ac-
cused Waukegan tot killer pleads not guilty.”122 Rather than seeking enlightenment 
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about issues or additional information, readers start looking for someone to blame 
when they read these articles.123 Infotainment news causes consumers to become 
more accusatory, more suspicious, and quicker to judge someone as guilty based 
on minimal facts. Citizens expect the press to serve as a “watch dog” and to priori-
tize accurate reporting over commercial gain, but whether infotainment organiza-
tions do this is extremely questionable. 124 Infotainment organizations are one of the 
key vehicles through which biases toward women accused of killing their children 
spread across the country.
Cunliffe’s study also followed two Australian newspapers as they covered 
the arrest, trial, and sentencing of a woman who had been accused of murdering 
her four infants.125 Cunliffe followed one “popular” newspaper and one “quality” 
newspaper.126 She defined a “popular” newspaper as one that that presented in-
formation in an emotional and attention-grabbing manner.127 Similar to American 
infotainment or tabloid journalism, these newspapers strive to portray information 
in an entertaining manner.128 In contrast, “quality” newspapers focus on producing 
high quality, “literary work.”129 They pay close attention to language and accuracy 
of content.130 Given that the United States has a similar structure to its media, this 
study provides important insight into the relationship between news reporting and 
bias in criminal trials. 
Cunliffe compiled extensive data about the methods used by both newspa-
pers in their reporting.131 She found that expert testimony was selectively reported 
in both papers,132 and that the popular newspaper went as far as to mix fact with 
fiction in its narratives about the trial.133 Rather than reporting events the way they 
unfolded during the trial, both newspapers carefully tailored the events in a way 
that would draw in more readership. Though the defendant put forth what Cunliffe 
felt to be a robust defense, the papers portrayed this defense as if it were virtually 
nonexistent.134
Distinguishing the two newspapers, Cunliffe found that the popular news-
paper used more sensational reporting techniques, such as printing photos of the 
children and writing that the mother’s acts resulted from “latent wickedness” after 
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she was sentenced.135 The popular newspaper presented less synthesized report-
ing of day-to-day events, while the quality newspaper attempted to synthesize the 
events.136 While the popular newspaper criminalized the mother, the quality news-
paper asked whether society had failed the children and looked broadly at child 
investigations.137 By including longer excerpts of the trial testimony, the quality 
newspaper allowed readers to see what evidence was actually presented at the trial 
and how it was used.138 By explicitly passing judgment on the mother’s “wicked-
ness,” the popular newspaper changed the function of the reader from fact analyst 
to fact consumer. 
These popular, or infotainment, organizations fail to publish facts that would 
provide the counterargument to their assertions, and they teach consumers to ac-
cept journalists’ judgments without a careful assessment of the criminal cases that 
they describe. By publicly labeling these women as killers and murderers, while 
failing to report facts such as the mental health defenses presented at their trials, 
infotainment organizations create a skeptical culture that is more prepared to pick 
up its torches and pitchforks than it is to digest information that may absolve these 
women of some level of criminal liability. This type of reporting violates the jour-
nalistic ethical commitment to avoiding sensationalism and reporting the truth. 
This narrative, heard in pieces over time by jurists, medical researchers, 
attorneys, and judges, also has detrimental results on the fairness of the trials of 
women who are charged with the deaths of their newborns. Cunliffe’s research 
demonstrates that the method used by infotainment reporters when covering these 
trials has promoted an ideology of motherhood based on incorrect stereotypes. The 
preconception that a person has about motherhood and familial structures will af-
fect the way that individuals allocate criminal responsibility.139 These news organi-
zations assume that mothers are naturally nurturing and assert that a mother whose 
infant dies must be criminally responsible for its death. 
These beliefs make their way into the courtroom through several avenues. 
First, they may affect the assumptions made by those responsible for medical re-
search. As individuals seek a criminal explanation, those researching these deaths 
may attempt to do the same, as evidenced in the 1990s with SIDS research. Second, 
witnesses, including expert witnesses, may increase the confidence in their asser-
tions as a trial progresses due to their desire to secure a conviction. Cunliffe asserts 
that this is exactly what happened in the trial that she followed.140 Finally, these as-
sumptions enter the courtroom with every juror who reads and is influenced by info-
tainment organizations. Such rampant bias places a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
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rights in grave danger.
C. Moving Forward
 Journalistic accountability will be essential in changing the narrative of 
neonaticide to one that prepares the public to consider the role of mental illnesses 
in these deaths. If the media presents these cases in a way that forecloses the pos-
sibility of mental illness or conditions such as neonaticide syndrome, then citizens 
cannot be expected to change their mindset simply because they have entered the 
courtroom. Those advocating for further research or education about neonaticide 
can have no better ally than the media, which has the unique ability to start a nation-
al dialogue about the syndrome and its role in neonaticide. The unbiased reporting 
of neonaticide will also aid parents of adolescents who commit the crime by allow-
ing them to better understand the experience of their children. This understanding 
is essential in order for parents to play a role in their children’s rehabilitation and 
for parents to help these youth exercise their Sixth Amendment right to present a 
complete defense. 
 Unfortunately, women committing neonaticide have few remedies against 
the sensationalism of the press. Defamation remedies can be obtained only in the 
most extreme of cases, as defendants need only prove that their statements are tech-
nically true to avoid liability.141 However, the tort claim of false light may provide a 
more sufficient remedy.142 Truth of facts is not a defense in a false light action, and 
a defendant may be liable for the one-sided or misleading presentation of facts.143 
The standard for a false light claim is also lower than the one that must be met in 
a defamation suit; a plaintiff in a false light claim need only prove that the facts 
would be “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”144 
The tort of false light would effectively punish violations of the code of eth-
ics that journalists are expected to follow. It is fair to journalists because it does not 
restrain their freedom of speech any more than they have already agreed to restrain 
it when they abide by the Society of Professional Journalists’ code of ethics. Also, 
it protects the privacy and mental health of adolescents who are in vulnerable posi-
tions, and it will ensure that news agencies report a more factually accurate version 
of neonaticide. The downside of the false light claim is that less than half of the 
states still allow this claim.145 In order for it to be effective, the false light claim 
would have to be revived in all states. 
The media’s power over the cultural understanding of these infant deaths 
combined with the difficulty of enforcing journalistic standards of ethics serves as 
     141.  Karcher, supra note 110, at 786.
     142.  Id. at 788.
     143.  Id.
     144.  Id. at 789.
     145.  Id.
180
   Fall 2013                                               Changing the Narrative of Neonaticide
possibly the strongest argument for allowing experts to submit evidence of neo-
naticide syndrome in court. Even if media reform measures are implemented in 
the United States, changing the narrative of neonaticide will take time. Cunliffe’s 
study serves as a powerful warning about the real connection between the media’s 
portrayal of events and the criminal trials of defendants. When defendants are faced 
with permanent stigma and criminal sentences that may last decades, the stakes are 
too high to prohibit experts from testifying about medical research that counters 
the assumptions and biases that jurors, judges, and attorneys alike bring into the 
courtroom. 
concLusIon
Enforcing violations of the journalistic code of ethics through tort law is 
only the first step in ensuring that information about the coercion, isolation, and 
denial experienced by women committing neonaticide is incorporated into the na-
tional narrative. Neonaticide experts, mental health experts, and other juvenile ad-
vocates must each commit to advocating for this information to be included in 
infotainment organizations and scholarly publications alike. If parents are to obtain 
any aid from the state in their efforts to identify signs of trouble in their adolescents, 
then this information must become widely available in order to stimulate conversa-
tions about prevention and rehabilitation.
While improving accountability for journalists will not immediately change 
the country’s perception of these crimes or the court’s response to women who kill 
their newborns, it will allow for a more honest dialogue about these crimes and 
about the experiences of women leading up to the crimes. A more open and honest 
national dialogue will lead to more appropriately targeted medical research, less 
bias infiltrating the judicial system through expert testimony, and better judicial 
outcomes for women who are criminally charged for the deaths of their newborns.
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